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Future War, Radical War, The New Art of War, and War Transformed,
are all recent books in which the authors look at the future of warfare and
account for emerging technologies. All four of these books are must-reads
for leaders interested in understanding how emerging technology will
impact both the theory of warfare and the future of warfare. The boldest,
and most informative of these four books is Radical War. Ford and
Hoskins write the rare book that takes big chances, introduces new
concepts (i.e., considering the conversion rate of actions at the operational
level of war and the need to move faster than the speed of narrative), and
goes beyond generic descriptions of what data and tech-centric warfare
may look like.
Though these books discussed how future technology will influence the
battlefield, there was a clear lack of discussion on the risks associated with
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the transition to a data-centric decision model where humans are replaced
by machines.1 The lack of risk discussion leaves the reader with the
impression that the authors did not want to wade into the challenges of
discussing risk in a complex, tech-saturated environment that is still
evolving. The two important themes that emerged after reading these four
books are the importance of understanding emerging technology and its
impact on the future battlefield, and the challenges of knowledge
management and information archiving.

Emerging Technology
Though each book takes a different approach to the analysis on how
technology shapes the future of warfare, a consensus emerged on the types
of technology about which leaders must learn. Weiss asserts that “AI
[Artificial Intelligence], autonomous, and semi-autonomous weapons
(e.g., “robots” or “drones”) will undoubtedly influence future war.” 2 Ryan
expands on the technologies listed by Weiss and claims that “eight specific
technologies – artificial intelligence, robotics, quantum technology,
biotechnology, energy weapons, hypersonics, space technology, and
additive manufacturing – are likely to have the greatest impact on twentyfirst century military affairs.”3 Hodges, Allen, and Lindley-French further
expand the impact of AI and argue that
AI would not be a stand-alone technology, but act in concert with
machine-learning [ML], human enhancement, genetic
manipulation, data analytics, simulation, behavioural science,
drone technologies, quantum-based sensors that can reveal the
ocean depths and whatever is sailing within it, cyber warfare,
synthetic technologies and nano-technologies linked to 3D printing,
hypersonic weapons, smart weapons, unmanned combat aerial
vehicles that form part of attack swarms, and the use of big data to
create synthetic reality to better inform often-automated decision
making.4
The authors capture the important technologies that are making or on the
verge of making significant impacts on the battlefield. The only aspect of
emerging technology that Weiss, Ryan, Hodges, Allen, and Lindley-French
failed to mention was the continued increase of mobile, connected devices
on the battlefield. Though mobile devices are not new, the ubiquity and
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continued advances in processing power of connected systems on the
battlefield increases the number of people who participate in and influence
conflict. Ford and Hoskins recognize that smart devices “remove the
bystander from war” which makes the “distinctions between audience and
actor, soldier and civilian, media and weapon become meaningless.”5 In
addition to removing the bystander from war, smart devices also influence
the way in which military forces prepare for operations.
Ford and Hoskins argue that “mobile connected devices are
revolutionising how armed forces organise for warfighting.”6 Additionally,
Ford and Hoskins assert that “cloud-enabled, networked and handheld
digital systems” change the way military “forces think through the
necessary steps needed to go from collecting targeting information to
taking a decision and dropping a bomb.”7 It is important to include mobile
devices as part of emerging technology because of how they impact
participation and planning in war. The continued augmentation of human
thought with technology coupled with the amount of data consumed and
produced from individuals, corporations, NGOs, and governments, creates
an unprecedented environment in which war moves at a relentless pace.

Technology & The Speed of War
There is consensus amongst all the authors that the speed of war will
increase exponentially as emerging technology becomes part of the
military decision-making cycle. Hodges, Allen, and Lindley-French claim
that “another major war in Europe would be hyperwar” which is “ultra-fast
warfare that combines a myriad of systems to wreak havoc in an instant.”8
They think that “hyperwar will exponentially accelerate the speed of war
across multi-domain warfare conducted via air, at sea, on land, in space, in
cyber space, and increasingly via information and deep, destructive human
and machine generated ‘knowledge.’”9 Ford and Hoskins propose their
own definition: radical warfare. They argue that “radical war is the
immediate and ongoing interaction between connected technologies,
human participants, and the politics of violence.”10 Hyperwar and radical
warfare both focus on the combination of the speed of warfare, technology
(including machines), and people. However, the future of warfare is
defined (the term warfare can also suffice without always trying to make a
new definition), leaders must be prepared for a speed of violence,
information, and decision-cycles never-before-seen.
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Ryan acknowledges that “the speed of planning, decision-making, and
action is increasing due to hypersonic weapons, faster media cycles
impacting political decisions, and the potential for AI to speed up
decision-making at many levels.”11 Ford and Hoskins assert that “armed
forces must have the capacity to fight at the speed of data transfer” which
“allow[s] them to be ahead of the media narrative, shaping stories even
before journalists have had chance to broadcast.”12 Ford and Hoskins
expand on the idea of fighting at the speed of data transfer and ask the
question: “if military operations have to keep up with the speed of
information as it is spread across civilian information data networks, then
when does war stop?”13 The future speed of warfare, information, and
decision-cycles will result in a complex ecosystem of inputs and outputs in
which militaries must make operational decisions not only to defeat the
enemy, but also to create rather than be a victim of a narrative. The speed
of warfare also necessitates a change to a top-down decision-cycle which
means decisions must be further delegated to subordinate chains of
command or to machines.
Ryan says that the “the application of AI and its accelerating influence in
war means that there must be wholesale reexamination of current chain of
command approaches and of the degree of delegation provided to
subordinate commanders”14 Allen, Hodges, and Lindley-French argue that
“given the speed of future war, demonstrable speed of command will be
central to both credible deterrence and warfighting.”15 Weiss also
recognizes that “improvements in AI algorithms and machine learning will
enable some weapons (including cyber weapons) to complete more
complex missions and perhaps even surpass human decision-making
abilities for select purposes.”16 Additionally, Ryan argues that “computerbased decisions are unlikely to have the requisite flexibility or discretion to
make humans irrelevant, particularly for real-time circumstances.”17
The furthest any of the books goes in discussing the delegation of decisionmaking is Future War and the Defence of Europe (the authors argue that
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) should have more
delegated authority and that the NATO command structure is insufficient
to deal with the rapid changes in warfare).18 The other books discuss the
importance of delegating decisions to people and/or machines, but never
provide an example or model for what that looks like in practice.
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It was disappointing that none of the four books laid out a model or
framework for what the delegation of decisions looks like (machine-only
loop, human-machine loop, human-only loop) in a future warfare
environment comprised of various technologies and the need to account
for and outpace adversary decision cycles. A framework focused on
decision delegation would quickly result in a requirement to develop risk
acceptance criteria for the delegation of decisions (another topic not
discussed in any of these books). It is easy to talk about how AI, ML, and
future technology will hypothetically speed up decision-cycles, but much
more challenging to talk about how risk is assessed and accepted prior to
new decision models being implemented. Any future decision-model will
depend on data access and data analysis. Ford and Hoskins discuss the
challenges associated with knowledge management (including data
sources and data governance) in Radical War.

Knowledge Management and Information Archiving
The most important topic discussed across all four books is that of
knowledge management. Ford and Hoskins argue that “identifying
military weaknesses and optimising performance through engagement in
history depends on information management and record-keeping.”19
Furthermore, the combination of an increase of information (and
disinformation) mixed with a push to digitize records leaves militaries
“reliant on the production of partial histories based on selected readings of
the public record combined with interviews of officers who understand
that these exercises have both career advancing and limiting effects.”20 The
effect of an inability to maintain a factual archive can “delegitimize official
histories of war” and limit a military’s future effectiveness if it cannot learn
from its last engagement.21
Ford and Hoskins argue that “audiences today are more like nodes in a
network, part of a hyperconnected ecology of war, that constantly create
and consume media but are not reliant on traditional broadcasters” which
leads to “relentless churning of different opinions and images of war, such
that consensus about what war is becomes much harder to construct and
maintain.”22 Additionally, they contend that “data decays, files get deleted,
hyperlinks break, cyberattacks corrupt code, [and] criminals use
ransomware to prevent access to material” which “adds to the sense of
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doubt that comes from working in a new war ecology where false
information spreads more quickly than truthful content.”23
Ford and Hoskins were the only authors to discuss the challenges of
maintaining an official record in an environment with misinformation,
restriction to data sources, echo chambers, and competing narratives.
Militaries depend upon official records from which to learn and drive
future changes to avoid becoming obsolete. Ford and Hoskins summed up
the fundamental challenge of technology and record-keeping as follows:
“technology consequently facilitates and constrains the digital individual
as they find ways to contribute towards and break the mainstream
consensus over what constitutes knowledge and what ought to form part of
the received historical record.”24
Technology will continue to increase the speed of both decision-cycles and
warfare on the future battlefield. Leaders cannot forget the importance of
record-keeping (including the source and access to data that informs
records) as they are bombarded with more and more information that
makes it challenging to decipher what really happened. All four books
covered the emergence of future technology, but none of them contained a
discussion of the risks associated with moving towards a data-centric
decision-model with machines in the loop.
The Risks Associated with Data & Tech-Centric Warfare
Military leaders must have a process to identify and accept risk during
both training and conflict. None of the four books put forth a framework to
discuss the risks associated with adding a machine into the decision cycle
during military operations. As the authors of each of the four books
discussed machines being part of the decision cycle, they skipped over
discussion about how military leaders should approach the risk associated
with this data-centric approach to warfare. A basic framework centered on
decision integrity should include the following categories: internal data,
external data, algorithmic, position, navigation, and timing (PNT), and
transport.25
Internal data is the data produced, governed, stored, and distributed
within an organization (in the case of the future of warfare, the military or
government). Leaders must understand if they have the right data
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required to feed their AI and ML models and if that data is secure. The
first question for any military or organization looking to become datacentric is whether the organization has the right data. The best data
governance and data products in the world are irrelevant if they don’t use
the right data inputs. Concurrent with the need to ensure an organization
captures the right data is the need to validate that its internal data is
secure. It is unlikely that any organization will ever have complete internal
data or data that is completely secure which necessitates understanding
the risk associated with decision outputs derived from internal data.
AI and ML models will also ingest external data as part of algorithms
designed to enhance decision-making. External data is any data that is
produced outside of the organization. External models (whether from
open-source or data shared from industry or military partners) must also
have a percentage of confidence related to data integrity measured against
the data production, data governance model, and data security from the
data source.
AI and ML models will have a variety of algorithms used to ingest and
analyze internal and external data. Organizations will put a heavy
emphasis on algorithmic security to ensure that a threat actor does not try
and manipulate the algorithms or the data that feeds the algorithms to
influence decision-outputs. Threat actors will also employ their own AI
and ML models to analyze outputs of a military or national data-centric
decision model to try and approximate the factors that influence an
algorithm. Algorithmic integrity must be captured during ongoing risk
identification.
PNT can fit in either internal or external data (depending on the source),
but it is worth mentioning as its own because of its importance. In a largescale conflict, military personnel from multiple armies will be scattered
across the air, land, sea domains conducting operations. The integrity of
PNT inputs is critical to any decision-model. If PNT is not correct (or if
there is an unacceptable level of risk associated with the integrity of
ingested PNT data), then the output of the model will lead to decisions
based on the wrong data. Decisions based on the wrong data will lead to
disastrous consequences in a conflict.
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Transport is the medium through which data is accessed by the AI and ML
models. If transport is disrupted, degraded, or denied, then the data
feeding the AI and ML algorithms will be incomplete. In a near-peer
conflict, it is inevitable that there will be long periods during which data
from multiple sources will be inaccessible. The amount of data received in
a decision-model compared to the amount of data the model identifies as
being accessible must be analyzed to identify the level of risk from a
recommended decision based on incomplete data.
The integrity of a data-centric decision model with a machine in the loop is
important for identifying the risk (at any given time) associated with
outputs from the model. A data-centric decision model with a machine in
the loop must assess the integrity of internal data, external data,
algorithmic, PNT, and transport to understand how much risk is
associated with each decision output.
Conclusion
Future War, Radical War, The New Art of War, and War Transformed,
show that authors from multiple countries with varying levels of military
and strategic experience agree that warfare will be fast, integrate myriad
new technologies, and will have machines as part of the decision cycle.
Radical War adds to the discussion by including the importance of
knowledge management to enable militaries to learn from the past to
shape the future. Each of the books discussed contain lessons from which
readers must learn when thinking about warfare in the future. Radical
War stands out amongst these four books for pushing the boundaries of
the existing literature and proposing new models, frameworks, and
theories of warfare to account for emerging technology.
As authors continue to address technology and the future of warfare, they
must discuss the risk management associated with adopting new
technologies, adding machines into the decision-cycle, and militaries
moving faster to try and create rather than be a part of someone else’s
narrative. Any discussion of risk should include the integrity related to
data inputs and the algorithms that use and analyze those inputs to
produce decision outputs.
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